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FOR REHEARING
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3.

Prior to submitting its Petition for Rehearing, the

State duly sought and received two ex parte enlargements of time
in which to file its petition.

The first was granted to January

23, 1990, the second was granted to February 2, 1990. The
State's Petition for Rehearing was timely submitted to the Court
on February 2, 1990.
4.

Defendant in his motion to strike the petition as

untimely submits that pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 22(c), the
State could seek only one ex-parte fourteen (14) day enlargement
of time in which to file the petition, that is to January 29,
1990.

Further, he argues that the effect of allowing the State

to submit its petition four days later was a deprivation of his
due process rights to a finality of judgment.
ARGUMENT
R. UTAH CT. APP. 35 GOVERNS THE SUBMISSION OF
A PETITION FOR REHEARING.
Defendant contends that the State's Petition for
Rehearing should be stricken by this Court as untimely on the
basis that this Court is without authority to grant more than one
ex parte enlargement of time.

Clearly, such a position is

contrary to the intent of the rules of appellate procedure which
specifically recognize this Court's inherent power to suspend the
rules, within only certain limitations, as the Court in its
discretion deems appropriate.

R. Utah Ct. App. 2.

But, more to the point is R. Utah Ct. App. 35 which
fully governs petitions for rehearing.

Rule 35 allows a petition

to be filed within fourteen days after entry of the decision
"unless shortened or enlarged by order."

The rule contains no

restrictions on the Court's exercise of its discretion in
determining the permissible time for filing a petition. Here,
the Court determined that additional time was warranted and
therefore entered its orders permitting the brief to be filed
within the additional twenty-four day period.
Defendant would have this Court ignore the clear
language of Rule 35 by applying R. Utah Ct. App. 22(c), which
governs ex parte motions, to restrict this Court's discretion.
However, whenever the writers of Rule 35 wanted another rule to
apply, they specifically referred to it (see, for example Rule
35(b) referring to R. Utah Ct. App. 27(a) and 26(b)).

But, the

writers made no such reference in Rule 35(a) which governs the
time for filing of the petition for rehearing.

Additionally,

even if Rule 22(c) were applicable to the time limitations of
Rule 35, Rule 22(c) is merely a directory and not mandatory rule.
It was adopted for "judicial convenience and flexibility" to
allow parties to, as a matter of right, file at least one ex
parte fourteen day extension in matters other than briefs.
Advisory Committee Note, R. Utah S. Ct. 22.

It does not however

preclude an appellate court from granting further ex parte
extensions as it deems appropriate.
Here, the State submitted its Petition for Rehearing in
accordance with Rule 35 and the orders of this Court.
Defendant's argument that this Court abused its discretion in
issuing two extensions ex parte is without merit.

At best, this

Court granted an additional ten days beyond that which defendant
asserts the State was entitled to under Rule 22(c).
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Such a brief

period of time cannot be construed to have prejudiced or denied
due process to an unincarcerated defendant raising an issue on
interlocutory appeal.
DATED this

7 ^

day of February, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney Gener
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CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Response to Defendant's Motion to Strike Petition for
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Christine Smith, Attorneys for Respondent, 236 South 300 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this / ^ - d a y of February, 1990.
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Petitioner,

:

v.

:

GREGORY J. MARSHALL,

:

Respondent.

Case No. 890121-CA

:

In submitting its Petition for Rehearing, petitioner
on page 6 of its Petition stated that the petition was being
submitted because of the State's belief that the Court in
rendering its decision had "failed to consider material facts and
misconstrued and overlooked controlling case law."

Additionally,

consistent with any document submitted to the Court, counsel for
the State represented through her signature that the Petition was
being submitted in good faith.

However, to fully comply with R.

Utah Ct. App. 35, the undersigned counsel for petitioner hereby

specifically certifies that the Petition for Rehearing is
submitted in good faith and not for delay.
DATED this

'<*^h day of February, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Certification of Counsel was mailed, postage prepaid,
to Jerold D. McPhee, and Christine Smith, Attorneys for
Respondent, 236 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
/^~-

day of February, 1990
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 890121-CA

Petitioner,
v.

Category No. 10

GREGORY J. MARSHALL,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The following issues are presented in the State's
petition for rehearing:
1.

Did the Court correctly conclude that the State, as

respondent, was precluded from raising the issue of defendant's
standing for the first time on appeal?
2.

Assuming that the State had waived the issue of

standing, did the Court correctly conclude that the State was
also precluded from arguing the reasonableness of the search and
seizure based on defendant's disclaimer of ownership of the
property searched and seized?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Gregory J. Marshall, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1989) (R.
2).

Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the marijuana (R.

23-24).

The motion was denied (R. 54-55, Findings and Order

Denying Motion to Suppress, dated February 15, 1989).
then filed an interlocutory appeal (R. 91, 187).

Defendant

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State agrees with the fact statement set forth in
the Court's opinion in State v. Marshall/ No. 890121-CA, slip op.
at 1-2 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1989) (hereafter cited as "Slip
op.") (copy of opinion attached in Appendix).

However, in

rendering its decision, the Court presumed certain additional
facts which are not supported by the record.
This Court's statement that the State's position was
that defendant's lack of standing precluded consideration of
the issues asserted by Mr. Marshall that
Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall was an
unconstitutional pretext, or that his
consequent detention exceeded constitutional
limits, or that Mr. Marshall did not
voluntarily consent to the search of the
suitcases found in the truck of his rental
car,
(Slip op. at 3 ) , is factually incorrect for several reasons.
Neither party took the position that Mr. Marshall
consented to the search of the suitcases.

Both below and on

appeal, consent was in issue only in relation to the search of
the vehicle and trunk area.
at 22-29).

(Br. of App. at 31-39; Br. of Resp.

Defendant never challenged the search of the

suitcases except as derivative of what he claimed was an
impermissible stop and detention.

Defendant's argument was that

the stop of his rental vehicle for a failed turn signal was
pretextual and that the subsequent consents to search the vehicle
and trunk were involuntary due to the coercive influence of an
unlawful detention (R. 56-87, 93-125; T-l. 32-36; Br. of App.,
Points I, II and III). Defendant waived any challenge to the
search and seizure of the suitcases on other grounds.
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985).
-2-

State v.

The issue of defendant's lack of standing was only
raised by the State as an additional ground for affirmance of the
lower court's denial of the motion to suppress.

Specifically,

the State did not challenge defendant's standing to object to the
stop or search of the vehicle generally.

(Br. of Resp. at 7-9).

Instead, it was argued that defendant's disclaimer of ownership
was not only sufficient to negate his standing to challenge the
search and seizure of the suitcases, but also validated the
reasonableness of the search and seizure of the suitcases in that
defendant had abandoned any privacy interest in that property
(Br. of Resp. at 8).

As such, the issue of standing would only

need be considered by the Court if the search could not otherwise
be sustained and defendant was not viewed as having waived any
challenge as to the suitcases.
Even though the State raised defendant's lack of
standing to object to the search of the suitcases, it was still
necessary for this Court to determine the reasonableness of the
stop and detention, for a disclaimer may be invalid if it
resulted from unlawful police action.

United States v. Labat,

696 F.Supp. 1419, 1425-26 (D.Kan. 1988), and cases cited therein.
Here, no improper conduct by the officer was found (Slip. op. at
7, 9, 14 n.9).

But, it remains necessary for the Court to rule

on the voluntariness of defendant's consents prior to any final
disposition of this case.

In short, the Court must still

determine the validity of defendant's consent to search the trunk
for purposes of determining the propriety of the officer being in
a position to view the suitcases and question defendant about
them.

Because defendant never challenged the search of the
suitcases, the Court's statement that "Mr. Marshall argues that
even if his initial stop and subsequent detention were not
constitutionally deficient, the subsequent search of the
suitcases found in the trunk of the vehicle without a warrant
violated his fourth amendment rights," (Slip op. at 9), is not
supported by the record on appeal.

The Court's statement that

"[t]he state contends, on the other hand, that Mr. Marshall
consented to the search of the suitcases," (Slip. op. at 9), is
also incorrect.

As discussed below, the issue of the validity of

the search and seizure of the suitcases has only been raised by
this Court, sua sponte, in oral argument and in its opinion.
The State raised the issue of defendant's lack of
standing as an additional basis of affirmance (Br. of Resp. at 712).

In doing so, the State did not argue that defendant had

consented to the search of the suitcases, but that defendant's
disclaimer of ownership was sufficient to defeat his standing.
During oral argument, the Court, sua sponte, raised the issue of
whether defendant's disclaimer could be construed as a consentin-fact to the search of the suitcases.

Neither party had

briefed the issue, as defendant had never challenged the search
of the suitcases.

Contrary to the Court's statement that "[i]n

this case, the state, the defendant, and the trial court all
focused on the issue of voluntary consent to search the
suitcases, not standing to assert a privacy interest in the
suitcases," (Slip op. at 4), no issue concerning the suitcases
was ever raised by defendant or considered by the trial court.

By presuming facts not in the record, this Court has,
sua sponte, raised a ground waived by defendant to reverse the
lower court's ruling.

By the Court's own characterization, this

was done despite the general rule of affirming the lower court's
ruling on any appropriate grounds (Slip op, at 5 n.2).

In

effect, this Court has ruled that the State's purported waiver of
standing is so defective as to negate all other bases for
affirming the lower court's ruling.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence raised only
the limited issues of the validity of the stop of defendant's
vehicle and the voluntariness of his subsequent consents to
search the interior and trunk area of the car.

Neither on appeal

nor below has defendant challenged the legality of the officer's
action in searching and seizing the suitcases. As such, no new
claim of error should be considered by this Court.
The State is not foreclosed from raising on appeal
additional grounds for affirmance of the lower court's denial of
a motion to suppress.

In this regard, standing is no different

than any other substantive constitutional issue.
Even if defendant has standing to challenge the search
and seizure of the suitcases, this Court cannot use that basis to
reverse the trial court's order unless it first determines that
defendant has not waived the issue and there are no other grounds
to sustain the trial court.

If this Court were to reach such

conclusions, it would still be necessary to remand the case to
the district court for further factual findings as to whether or

not the officer's actions were reasonable in searching the
suitcases since this issue was never presented to nor considered
by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
This petition for rehearing is submitted pursuant to R.
Utah Ct. App. 35, on the basis that the Court in rendering its
decision in State v. Marshall, No. 890121-CA (Utah Ct. App. Dec.
26, 1989), failed to corsider material facts and misconstrued and
overlooked controlling case law.

Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah

157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913); Brown v. Pickard, denying
reh'g., 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886).
POINT I
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE STATE IS
PRECLUDED FROM RAISING, FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL, A DEFENDANT'S LACK OF STANDING AS AN
ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR AFFIRMANCE IS CONTRARY
TO ESTABLISHED LAW.
A.

There is no support for the Court's conclusion that
standing is a unique issue, more akin to an
affirmative defense.

In rendering its opinion in State v. Marshall, this
Court concluded that the State, as respondent, is precluded from
raising a defendant's lack of standing for the first time on
appeal.

As noted by the Court:
Our conclusion may seem at odds with the
general rule that we "may affirm the trial
court's decision on any proper grounds, even
though the trial court assigned another
reason for its ruling." . . . . We agree
with the general rule, but find the issue of
fourth amendment standing to be unique.
Fourth amendment standing involves more than
simply applying another legal principle to
sustain an evidentiary ruling. The failure
to raise a fourth amendment standing claim is
more analogous to the failure to plead and

try an affirmative defense or an attempt to
assert a new theory of recovery for the first
time on appeal. . . .
(Slip. op. at 5 n.2) (citations omitted).

It is this assumption

of the Court's which lies as the false predicate of its opinion.
Utah and federal case law recognize that it is the
defendant's burden to establish that "his own Fourth Amendment
rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure."

Rakas

v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 1T3, 131 n.l (1978); State v. Valdez, 689
P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984).

Accord State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d

194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Even a defendant charged with a

possessory crime is no longer presumed to have standing, for mere
physical possession of seized property cannot "substitute for a
factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched." United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980) (overruling automatic standing
rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (I960)).

Accord

Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 U.S. 1166, 1171
(Utah 1987); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d at 1335.
Despite the general acceptance of defendant's
affirmative duty to establish standing, this Court attempts to
regress to applying an automatic standing standard by
characterizing lack of standing as a distinct, affirmative
defense which must be raised below or waived (Slip op. at 5).
The only authority for the Court's proposition is the
Utah Supreme Court's citing of State v. Goodman, 42 Wash.App.
331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), in rendering its decision in State v.
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989).

While it is true that the

Washington Court of Appeals in Goodman made the general statement
that the government is precluded from raising standing for the
first time on appeal, this Court ignores the significant
difference in Goodman's applicability to Utah.
automatic standing state.

Washington is an

711 P.2d at 1060. As such, a

defendant charged with a possessory crime will be presumed to
have standing unless challenged by the state, ^d.

This is

directly contrary to Utah and federal case law which imposes an
obligation of factual proof on the defendant.

(See Utah cases

cited above.)
In Goodman, the Washington appellate court relied,
without modification, on an earlier Washington decision, State v.
Grundy, 25 Wash.App. 411, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980), which was also
cited by the Utah Supreme Court.
1139.

State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at

Consistent with the State's position in the present case,

the Grundy court refused to allow the state, as appellant, to
raise standing for the first time on appeal.

607 P.2d at 1237.

Specifically, the court recognized that two different rules
apply, depending on whether a new issue is raised on appeal by
the appellant or the respondent.

Since the general rule is that

errors cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, an
appellant is generally viewed as having waived any error not
raised in the court below.

However, a respondent may be heard

for the first time on appeal since it is "the duty of an
appellate court to affirm upon any ground supported by the
record, even if not the ground utilized by the trial court."
P.2d at 1237.
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The cases utilized by this Court to analogize standing
to an affirmative defense (Slip. Op. at 5 n.2) are all cases
consistent with the State's position that only the party claiming
error is precluded from asserting new grounds on appeal. The
Court has cited no support for its conclusion that "the issue of
fourth amendment standing [is] unique," (Jd.).

Indeed, such a

conclusion is directly contrary to all modern approaches which
incorporate standing as merely another substantive issue of
fourth amendment law.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 138-39;

State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138; State v. Greuber, 776 P.2d
70, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah
1989).
B.

Under Utah and federal case law, standing is merely
another substantive issue of search and seizure
law.

Beginning with Rakas v. Illinois, the United States
Supreme Court has concluded that analytically standing is no more
than "a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure
has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect."

439 U.S. at 141. Rejecting

the previous automatic standing rule, the Supreme Court now
refuses to "use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a
factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched."
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980).

United States v.

Instead, the inquiry is:

[F]irst, has the individual manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search? Second, is
society willing to recognize that expectation
as reasonable?

California v. Ciraolof 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986).
Here, defendant failed to present any evidence during
the suppression hearing to controvert the officer's testimony
that defendant disclaimed ownership in the property prior to the
officer's search and seizure (T-l. 3-47).

As such, he failed to

establish his standing as to the property searched and seized.
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334; State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194;
State v. Schneider, 51 Or. App. 161, 625 P.2d 150 (1981).
This Court would excuse defendant's failure on the
grounds that he had no reason to factually meet the "defense" of
lack of standing (Slip. op. at 5 n.2).
the facts of this case.

Such a conclusion ignores

The State has never challenged

defendant's standing as it relates generally to the search of the
vehicle.

Clearly, defendant, pursuant to a valid rental

agreement and as the legitimate driver of the vehicle, had
standing to contest the stop and search of the car.

But since

defendant never raised any issue below specifically as to the
search of the suitcases, the State had no necessity to challenge
his standing as it relates to his disclaimer.

Despite

defendant's waiver of a challenge to this aspect of the search,
State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126 (Utah 1987); State v.
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985), the Marshall decision
imposes a duty on a prosecutor to object on all possible grounds,
raised and unraised, when confronted with a motion to suppress.
No Utah or federal case law supports the Court's view.
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C.

The Court has misconstrued and misapplied State v,
Schlosser and prior Utah case law.

This Court concluded that State v. Schlosser/ 774 P.2d
1132 (Utah 1989), precludes the State from raising "a substantive
issue or 'claim of error'" for the first time on appeal (Slip op.
at 4).

But, Schlosser never discussed the raising of substantive

issues by a respondent to affirm a ruling; the opinion was solely
limited to new claims of errors.

Id. at 1138.

The distinction is important, for the Schlosser Court
did not view itself as creating new law, but as simply applying
the general rule that a new claim of error should not be
considered for the first time on appeal.

738 P.2d at 1138.

Additionally, while this Court specifically declined to see any
significance in the fact that the State, as appellant in
Schlosser, never raised a lack of standing (Slip. op. at 4), the
Utah Supreme Court clearly did when it declined to consider the
standing issue as "it has not even been raised by the parties,
either here or in the court below," id. at 1139. Accord United
States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1462-63 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989)
(must distinguish between state permissibly raising standing for
the first time on appeal and state totally waiving issue by never
raising below or on appeal).
The Utah Supreme Court neither overruled nor modified
any existing Utah law in deciding Schlosser.

Instead, it merely

cited to three cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition
that under the circumstances the State should be deemed to have
waived standing.

738 P.2d at 1139. Two of these cases, State v.

Goodman, 42 Wash.App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), and State v.

Grundy, 25 Wash.App. 411, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980), have previously
been discussed (see supra at 7-8). The third, Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 n.4 (1973), held that where there was
no evidence in the trial court that the defendants had either a
possessory or propriety interest in the property seized, it was
inappropriate for the defendants to assert that they had
"constructive possession" in an attempt to invoke the then
existing automatic standing rule for the first time on appeal.
Based on the case law c^ted, there is no support for this Court's
conclusion that:
[T]he Schlosser standing rule was fashioned
to protect the defendant from being required
to deal with new legal issues on appeal when
he had no warning of the necessity to develop
the relevant facts below.
(Slip op. at 4). The direct opposite is true.

It is the

respondent which is to be protected from having new claims of
error considered for the first time on appeal, As will be
discussed below, such a position is consistent with the majority
view.
This Court's interpretation of Schlosser is also
inconsistent with prior Utah case law and in conflict with the
recent Utah Court of Appeal decision, State v. Tebbs, No. 890088CA (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1990).

The Utah Supreme Court, sua

sponte, has considered standing for the first time on appeal in
State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989), cert, pending
S.Ct.

(Dec. 23, 1989); Society of Prof. Journalists, Utah

Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 1987); State v.
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987); Terracor v. Utah
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Bd. of State Lands & Forrestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986);
Utah Restaurant Assn. v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d
1159, 1160 (Utah 1985); and State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d at 1335. In
State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme
Court allowed the State, as respondent, to raise standing for the
first time on appeal, and on that ground affirmed while rejecting
the lower court's finding of consent.
Here, the State, as respondent, asserted a lack of
standing as an additional ground for affirming the trial court's
decision where defendant had otherwise waived the issue.

Nothing

in Utah case law precludes the State from doing so.
D.

The Court's position is in conflict with the
majority of jurisdictions in the United States.

The Court's position that the issue of standing may not
be raised for the first time on appeal is in direct conflict with
the majority of federal and state case law.

United States v.

McBean, 861 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1988) (despite government
concession on standing below, issue allowed to be raised for the
first time on appeal even though government was appellant);
United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374, 1381-83 (10th Cir. 1981)
(government, as appellant, allowed to raise on appeal since
defendant bears burden of establishing standing);

United States

v. Snowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1417 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987) (raised
sua sponte); United States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1462-63 n.4
(9th Cir. 1989) (government could have raised for first time on
appeal but waived issue where not raised either below or on
appeal); People v. Dasilva, 254 Cal.Rptr. 563, 565, 207
Cal.App.3d 43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (state not precluded

from arguing standing for the first time on appeal); St. John v.
State, 400 So.2d 779, 780 (Fla.App. 1981) (no waiver by state);
but compare State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464, 468 n.4 (Fla. 1989),
cert, granted, 109 S.Ct. 3183 (1989) (state waived where as
appellant never raised standing below or on appeal); People v.
Keller, 444 N.E.2d 118, 121, 93 111.2d 432, 67 111.Dec. 79 (1982)
(no waiver where state was appellant but had originally prevailed
below).

See also United States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554, 1558

n.10 (11th Cir. 1989) (defendant waived search issue for garage
when only argued below search of vehicle on street); United
States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Schmit, 881 F.2d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 1989) (cases
refusing to consider any new claim of error on appeal).
This Court misinterprets Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204 (1981) (Slip. op. 4). In Steagald, the government had
taken the position in the trial court, in the circuit court on
appeal, and when opposing the granting of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court that the house searched was the
defendant's residence and occupied by defendant and his wife.
451 U.S. at 209-210. The government, after certiorari was
granted, for the first time asserted that the home was not in
fact defendant's but belonged to a third party such that
defendant had no expectation of privacy in the home. Jjd. The
Court concluded that the government was precluded from arguing a
position factually appositive of all its prior positions. But,
in reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court did not hold that
the government was generally precluded from raising standing for

the first time on appeal.

To the contrary, the Court expressly

recognized that the government could procedurally have raised the
issue in the court of appeals or even when opposing certiorari,
but instead made explicit factual claims to the contrary.

IcL at

211 n.5.

The government was precluded based on the facts, not

the law.

Accord United States v. Maez, 872 F,2d 1444, 1453 (10th

Cir. 1989) (state precluded from arguing cont3:ary factual
position on appeal from that specifically raised and argued
below).
United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763 (8th Cir.
1984), would apply Steagald more strictly by holding that the
government may lose its right to raise standing on appeal if the
government in trial asserts that the defendant had sufficient
possession for conviction.

This view is a distinct minority and

theoretically unsupportable under an expectation of privacy
concept of standing.

United States v. Salvucci, 443 U.S. at 88-

89 (a prosecutor may legitimately argue that a defendant lacks a
privacy interest while seeking conviction for a possessory
crime).

Accord United States v. Gomez, 770 F.2d 251, 254 (1st

Cir. 1985); People v. Gibson, 114 Ill.App. 483, 70 111. Dec. 308,
449 N.E.2d 182, 185 (111. App. Ct. 1983); People v. Dasilva, 254
Cal.Rptr. at 565-66 (cases specifically distinguishing Morales
and Steagald).

POINT II
IN CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF THIS CASE, THE
COURT HAS IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO ANALYZE THE
EFFECT OF DEFENDANT'S DISCLAIMER IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE REASONABLENESS OF THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
This Court concluded that if the State waived the issue
of standing that the State was also precluded from utilizing the
same facts, that is the disclaimer, to support the reasonableness
of the warrantless search (Slip, op, at 14-15)•

In part, the

Court based this conclusion on the incorrect factual assumption
that the State was arguing that defendant had consented to the
search of the suitcases.

(See Statement of Facts at 2).

But,

the Court also failed to recognize that defendant's disclaimer of
any privacy interest in the suitcases did not simply apply to
standing but also to the reasonableness of the officer's actions.
Rawlinqs v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)
Here, the reasonableness of the officer's search based
on defendant's disclaimer need not be considered unless this
Court were to determine 1) that defendant did not waive the issue
of the search and seizure of the suitcases, 2) that defendant has
standing, and 3) that no other grounds exist to sustain the lower
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. Assuming those
conditions arguendo, there is no basis for this Court to conclude
that the State cannot factually argue defendant's disclaimer for
purposes of establishing that because defendant abandoned any
interest in the property, the warrantless search and seizure was
reasonable under the circumstances.

Cases with similar facts to those at bar, where the
disclaimer was made in response to police questioning, are:
United States v. Carrasquillo, 877 F.2d 73 (D.C.Cir. 1989);
United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 1742 (1989); United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d
1570 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Zabalaga, 834 F.2d 1062
(D.C.Cir. 1987); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982); United States v.
Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S.
994 (1982); United States v. Washington, 677 F.2d 394 (4th Cir.),
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982); United States v. Berd, 634
F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. LaBat, 696 F.Supp.
1419 (D.Kan. 1988); People v. Dasilva, 254 Cal.Rptr. 563, 207
Cal.App.3d 43, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). United States v.
McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (6th Cir. 1982), cert, denied,
464 U.S. 933 (1983).
Assuming the necessity of engaging in this alternative
analysis/ since the lower court never considered the issue of
defendant's disclaimer of ownership for purposes of determining
the reasonableness of the search and seizure of the suitcases,
this Court could remand for the entry of appropriate factual
findings, Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972); or in the
alternative, require supplemental briefing on the issue by the
parties based upon the record now before the Court.

CONCLUSION
Aside from the merits of this case, this Court
procedurally erred in reversing the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress.

Either this Court must review

the substance of the trial court's ruling and affirm, or
determine that the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous on
all grounds.

If clearly erroneous in all respects such that the

order may not be sustained, this Court must then determine if the
State has waived the isstie of standing and defendant has
preserved the issue of the search and seizure of the suitcases.
If it so determines, then this Court could remand for the entry
of proper factual findings as the lower court never considered
the issue, or in the alternative, require supplemental briefing
by the parties based on the record now before the Court.
In sum, this Court should grant the State's petition
for rehearing for purposes of correcting the Court's opinion to
f)

conform to established law.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

^

day of February,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Jackson.
BILLINGS, Judge:
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr. Marshall"), was
charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pre-trial
motion to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized from the
rental car he was driving when he was arrested. The trial court
denied Mr. Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory
appeal. We reverse.
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure of the contraband
in detail as the legal issues presented are fact sensitive.
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery ("Trooper Avery") was driving
on Interstate 70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's
vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a motor home. Trooper
Avery observed that Mr. Marshall^ turn signal remained blinking
for approximately two miles after he passed the motor home. Not
knowing whether Mr. Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the signal on, Trooper

Avery pulled the vehicle over to inform Mr. Marshall of the
problem and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper Avery had
issued similar warning citations for turn signal violations
approximately five to ten times in the previous six-month period.
Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall, Trooper Avery noticed the
vehicle had California license plates. He approached Mr.
Marshall's vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn signal
problem. Mr. Marshall responded that he had been having "a hard
time keeping the thing turned off."
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his driver's license and
vehicle registration. Mr. Marshall produced a New York driver's
license and a California rental agreement for the vehicle. Mr.
Marshall said he was going skiing in Denver and planned to return
the car to San Diego, California. However, the rental agreement
indicated that the car would be returned in New York in five days.
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became suspicious that Mr.
Marshall might be transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr.
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car where he issued a
warning citation for "Lights, head, tail, other." Trooper Avery
then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the rental
agreement.
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying
alcohol, drugs or firearms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not.
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could "look inside
the vehicle." Mr. Marshall responded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery
and Mr. Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The
passenger door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached in on the
driver's side to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a small
red bag on the floor of the vehicle and asked if he could open
it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No contraband was found inside the bag
or the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall had a key to the
trunk and if Mr. Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall
attempted to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly that
Trooper Avery had to assist him by holding the key latch cover up
while Mr. Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw four
padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk. Trooper
Avery asked Mr. Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr.
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper Avery then asked if he
could look in the suitcases. Mr. Marshall immediately reversed
his statement and responded that the suitcases were not his and
must have already been in the trunk when he rented the vehicle.
Trooper Avery testified there was some play in the zipper of one
bag and he unzipped it far enough to see a green leafy
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for
possession of a controlled substance.
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Mr, Marshall did not testify or present any evidence to
contradict Trooper Avery's testimony during the hearing below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
M

[W]e will not disturb the trial court's factual evaluation
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
unless it is clearly erroneous.* State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972,
974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). £££ also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d
191/ 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). Further# *[t]he trial courtfs finding is clearly
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence
or if [the appellate court] reach[es] a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Sery, 758
P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
STANDING—EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
The state argues that we need not reach the issues asserted
by Mr. Marshall that Trooper Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall was an
unconstitutional pretext, or that his consequent detention
exceeded constitutional limits, or that Mr. Marshall did not
voluntarily consent to the search of the suitcases found in the
trunk of his rental car. As a threshold argument, the state
claims that Mr. Marshall lacks standing to challenge the seizure
of the suitcases as he disclaimed any ownership or possessory
interest in the suitcases both during the search and subsequent
to his arrest and, thus# had no expectation of privacy in their
contents.1 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128# 138-50 (1978);
State v. Valdez. 689 P.2d 1334# 1335 (Utah 1984); State v.
Grueber. 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. DeAlo,
748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The fatal problem with the state's argument is the state
raises standing for the first time on appeal. The Utah Supreme
1. The state relies upon the following testimony from the
preliminary hearing:
Q.

And what was inside the trunk?

A.

There were four suitcases.

Q.

Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases?

A.

Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly,
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have
been in there when he rented the car.

Q o m ii

.PA
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Court recently squarely held that standing to challenge the
validity of a search under the fourth amendment "is not a
jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a substantive doctrine that
identifies those who may assert rights against unlawful searches
and seizures." State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah
1989). Citing the general rule that a substantive issue or
-claim of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,"
the court deemed the issue of standing waived. !£. at 1138-39.
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, claiming that in
Schlosser the state not only failed to raise the issue of
standing in the motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal.
We do not find the distinction determinative. We believe the
Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to protect the defendant
from being required to deal with new legal issues on appeal when
he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts
below.
In this case, the state, the defendant, and the trial court
all focused on the issue of voluntary consent to search the
suitcases, not standing to assert a privacy interest in the
suitcases. The defendant may well have chosen to testify at the
motion to suppress hearing to contradict the trooper's testimony
that he had disclaimed ownership of the suitcases had the state
chosen to litigate the issue of standing below.
In Steaaald v. United States. 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the United
States Supreme Court also refused to allow the government to
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time
on appeal. The Court refused to allow the state to claim that
the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the house searched
as a ground for sustaining the lower court's ruling denying a
motion to suppress when the state had not made this claim at
trial. The Court concluded:
The Government, however, may lose its
right to raise factual issues of this sort
before this Court when it has made
contrary assertions in the courts below,
when it has acquiesced in contrary
findings by those courts, or when it has
failed to raise such questions in a timely
fashion during the litigation.
1&. at 209.
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Thus, we conclude that the state may not for the first time
on appeal claim that Mr. Marshall lacks standing to assert a
privacy interest in the contraband seized 2 to uphold the trial
court's denial of the motion to suppress.

2. Our conclusion me seem at odds with the general rule that we
"may affirm the trial^court's decision on any proper grounds,
even though the trial court assigned another reason for its
ruling.- State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). We
agree with the general rule, but find the issue of fourth
amendment standing to be unique. Fourth amendment standing
involves more than simply applying another legal principle to
sustain an evidentiary ruling. The failure to raise a fotirth
amendment standing claim is more analogous to the failure to
plead and try an affirmative defense or an attempt to assert a
new theory of recovery for the first tine on appeal. See
Banoerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) (-It is
axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties in
the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.-);
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(defendant cannot raise constitutional issues for first time on
appeal); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1005 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (defendant cannot raise affirmative defense for first time
on appeal); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) ("matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at
the trial may not be raised for the first time on appeal.-);
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 637 n.2
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (matters not presented to trial court prior
to summary judgment cannot be raised for first time on appeal).
The state asserts fourth amendment standing to validate what
otherwise would be an unconstitutional search. The defendant
must have an opportunity to factually meet this defense to an
unconstitutional search.
Furthermore, although the Utah Supreme Court applied the
waiver of fourth amendment standing rule to uphold the trial
court's granting of a motion to suppress in Schlosser, the court
relied on State v. Goodman, 42 Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057
(1985), which held the state could not raise the issue of
standing for the first time on appeal to provide an alternative
ground for sustaining the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress. Id. at 1060.
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PRETEXT STOP
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper Avery used the fact
that his turn signal was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his
vehicle to search for evidence of drug trafficking.
The protective shield of the fourth amendment applies when an
officer stops an automobile on the highway and detains its
occupants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). A police officer may constitutionally stop a citizen on
two alternative grounds. First# the stop "could be based on
specific, articulable facts which, together with rational
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a
crime.- Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State
v, Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truiillo,
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Second, the police
officer can Hstop an automobile for a traffic violation committed
in the officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. However,
an officer may not use a traffic violation stop as a pretext to
search for evidence of a ,more serious crime, id.
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. Marshall's vehicle
to investigate his hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved
in drug trafficking, we determine whether a hypothetical
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances
confronting him or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to issue
a warning for failing to terminate a turn signal, id. at 978.
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop of his vehicle is
similar to the stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra. We
disagree. In Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was that
the driver remained in the left lane too long after passing a
car. In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment problem
with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to turn it off.3
Courts consistently have held that a police officer can stop a

3. While the warning citation does not specify which provision
of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, the state asserts that
his conduct was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1)
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides:
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car when he or she believes
the carfs safety equipment is not
4
functioning properly.
Furthermore/ unlike the officer in Sierra, Trooper Avery was
not suspicious of Mr. Marshall for other reasons before the stop,
had not followed him in order to find seme reason to pull him
over/ and/ before the alleged violation occurred/ had not radioed
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle.
In conclusion/ we find Trooper Avery*s stop of Mr. Marshall's
vehicle was not a pretext/ but was a valid exercise of police
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's vehicle was functioning
properly.

(Footnote 3 continued)
It is a misdemeanor for any person to
drive or move or for the owner to cause or
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on
any highway any vehicle or combination of
vehicles which is in such unsafe condition
as to endanger any person, oi which does
PPt contain thpge part? pr is not &t 9 U
times equipped with lamps and other
equipment in proper condition and
gfljUStmept . . . .
4. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648/ 660-61 (1979)/ the
United States Supreme Court stated that an officer has a duty in
the interest of highway safety to stop vehicles for safety
reasons. "Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements
are observable/ and something can be done about them by the
observing officer, directly and immediately." Jjl. at 660. The
Court inferred that as long as an officer suspects the driver is
violating "any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and
equipment regulations/" the police officer may legally stop the
vehicle. Ifl. at 661. See Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353/ 1355
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court held stop justified when vehicle's
headlight was out/ a tail light was broken/ the license plate and
windows were obscured/ and speeding); State v. Puig. 112 Ariz.
519/ 544 P.2d 201# 202 (1975) (suspicion of defective turn
signals justified stop); State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224/ 224 (Me.
1989) (stop justified when blinking headlights led officer to
stop vehicle for safety reasons).
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UNREASONABLE DETENTION
Next, Mr. Marshall complains generally that the extent of his
detention and the scope5 of Trooper Avery*s investigation exceeded
constitutional limits. Again, we disagree.
Once a driver is lawfully stopped, an officer may inquire as
to information about the driver and the vehicle "reasonably
related in scope to the justification- for the detention. United
States v. Brianoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (quoting Terrv
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)).
The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a
bright-line rule as tc^ the acceptable length of a detention
because "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern
over rigid criteria.M United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
(1985). The Court has chosen to focus, not on the length of the
detention alone, but on "whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant." !£. at 686.
In Sharpe, the Court found that a twenty-minute detention
after a highway stop for suspected drug trafficking was not
excessive where the officer examined the driverfs license,
examined his ownership papers, requested and was denied
permission to search the camper, and then stepped on the rear
bumper, noting that it did not move, thus confirming his
suspicion that it was overloaded. Ifi. at 687. The Court
distinguished this reasonable detention from those involved in
Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Florida v. Rover, 460
U.S. 491 (1983); and United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983),
stating that it was not the length of detention, but the events
which occurred during the detention which transformed the

5. We do not analyze this issue under article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution as the state constitutional issue was not
sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis
provided on appeal as to why our analysis should be different
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326,
327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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investigative stops in these cases into a "defacto arrest."
at 683-86.6

id.

Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten
minutes of stopping Mr. Marshall. Based upon the facts obtained
during routine questioning and issuing the warning citation, the
officer became suspicious that Mr. Marshall was involved in
transporting drugs. He returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license,
the car rental agreement and the citation. Trooper Avery then
asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs
in the vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper
Avery immediately askc 3 for permission to look into the vehicle
and received Mr. Marshall's consent.
We find that Trooper Avery's initial investigation was within
the scope of his traffic stop and that Trooper Avery's immediate
request to search the vehicle and his expeditious completion of
the search did not constitute an unreasonable detention.
Furthermore, Mr. Marshall was not moved to another location nor
treated in a manner to support a finding of a "defacto arrest."
CONSENT
Finally, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his initial stop
and subsequent detention were not constitutionally deficient, the
subsequent search of the suitcases found in the trunk of the
vehicle without a warrant violated his fourth amendment rights.
The state contends, on the other hand, that Mr. Marshall
consented to the search of the suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's

6. Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (defendant taken
from neighbor's home, transported unwillingly to police station,
was subjected to custodial interrogation for one hour until he
made incriminating statements); Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491
(1983) (defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized, then he
was taken to a small room where he was questioned and his luggage
inspected); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
(defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized for 90 minutes
to take it to narcotics detection dog for "sniff test," police
knew of arrival time and should have had the dog on hand)•
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search of the suitcases and subsequent seizure of the mariiuana
without a search warrant was constitutionally permissible.'
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is
conducted as a result of the defendant's voluntary consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "[T]he question
[of] whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary1 or was
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. "A trial court's
finding of voluntary consent will not be reversed unless it is
clearly erroneous." * nited States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130
(1st Cir. 1978), cert/ denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979).
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977),
the Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the
government to sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent
was given:
(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and
intelligently given"; (2) the government
must prove consent was given without
duress or coercion, express or implied;
and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights and
there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.

7. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had probable
cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore,
need not deal with the troublesome issue of whether probable
cause to search an automobile is sufficient under the automobile
exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk of a
car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (if
probable cause exists, police can search closed containers found
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)
(warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi
invalid); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the trunk of a
vehicle invalid); State v. Hvoh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 n.l (Utah
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the
Ross holding).
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Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684
(10th Cir. 1962)). See also United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d
1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback,
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972,
980-81 (Utah Ct. Appl 1988).
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, the
ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the specific area
agreed to by defendant. "The scope of a consent search is
limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself. . . . Any
police activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect."
United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); see,
e.g., People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope of
consent exceeded when police asked to "look around" the house,
then conducted a 45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and
closed containers).
The trial court made the following finding on the issue of
Mr. Marshall's consent: "The Defendant consented to the search.
There was no evidence of duress or coercion." This conclusory
finding on consent is not particularly helpful in determining
whether Mr. Marshall's consent was "unequivocal and specific" as
it does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed could be
searched—the interior of the passenger compartment, the trunk,
or the locked suitcases. The relevant portions from the
transcript of Trooper Avery's testimony are more enlightening:
Q.

What were the words he [sic] used when you asked him to
search his vehicle?

A.

I asked Mr. Marshall if—if there were any—if there was
any—were there any drugs in the vehicle, and he took
two or three seconds—no, wait a minute, I guess—I
first asked him if he was carrying any weapons and he
told me no. I then asked him if he was carrying any—if
there was any alcohol in the vehicle, he said that he
did not drink. I recall both answers were quite quick.
And then I asked him if there were any drugs in the
vehicle, he paused for, you know, probably two or three
seconds, and then told me no. I then asked him if it
would be okay if I looked in the vehicle, search the
vehicle, and he said go ahead.

Q.

Now, did you ask if you could look in the vehicle, or
did you ask if you could search the vehicle.
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A.

Well, according to this [his report], I said—I asked if
I could look in the vehicle.

Q«

So, it was "look in the vehicle"?
You didn't ask if you could open anything inside the
vehicle or anything else, did you?

A.

No.

Q.

And what happened then?

A.

Mr. Marshall just told me, you know, he said go right
ahead. He got out, gathered up his papers and we walked
up to the front of the vehicle, and he had to open the
passenger door, as I recall.

Q.

And how did you get in the trunk?

A.

I asked him, I said—asked him if he had the key to the
trunk and he says yes, and I says—and I asked him if
he's [sic] open it, which he did, he tried. He was
extremely nervous at the time. I —

Q,

So did you open the trunk?

A.

No, sir, I did not. He—he could not—there was a
little latch over the key hole. He was shaking so hard,
he couldn't even hold the latch open, so I held the
latch up for him so he could insert the key.

Q.

And what was inside the trunk?

A.

There were four suitcases.

Q.

Did you ask if you could look in those suitcases?

A.

Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I asked him what
was in the suitcases, and he told me, right quickly,
clothes. Then when I looked at him again, he told me
that he didn't know where they came from, they must have
been in there when he rented the car.

Q.

At that point, you opened the suitcases?
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A*

Couldn't open them, they were padlocked shut.

Q.

So, you broke the lock?

A.

No. I—one part could zip open a little ways, and I
opened it—or unzipped it, far enough where I could see
the contents of one bag.

Q.

And you didn't ask permission to look inside the
suitcases, did you?

A.

I donft recall if I asked specifically to look inside
those/ no.

Q.

So, to look inside the suitcases, you were based on the
permission to look inside the vehicle; is that correct?

A.

Well, I retract that. His first response was clothes
when I asked him what it was, and then I asked him if I
could look in the suitcases, and he told me, well,
they're not mine, they must have been in the trunk when
I rented the car. So, yes, he did say they weren't his.

Q.

If they weren't his, how come you charged him with the
crime?

A.

He told me they weren't his, that's what he said.
said go—when I asked—

Q.

But you didn't ever get permission from him to search
the suitcases, did you? And at that point, you had them
out of the vehicle; is that correct?

A.

Uh huh (affirmative). I took one out.

Q.

And it was locked?

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

Q.

And you had to work around the lock to look inside?

A.

Well, there was a little play in it, enough where you
could see inside.

Q.

And to look inside the suitcase, you were basing the
permission to look inside the vehicle?

A.

Yes.
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Mr. Marshall contends that Trooper Avery's request to "look
in the carM did not constitute a request to search the vehicle.
We disagree. Mr. Marshall gave his consent, although not
precisely phrased as consent ••to search," then stood by while the
trooper searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
••Failure to object to the continuation of the search under these
circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was
within the scope of consent." United States v. Espinoza, 782
F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); £££ also United States v.
Corral-Corral, 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1544 (D. Wyo. 1988).
Because of our holding, we need not reach the more difficult
issue of whether Mr. Marshall's opening the trunk constituted
implied consent to search the trunk under the totality of the
circumstances presented. See United States v. Almand, 565 F.2d
927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied. 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (voluntary
consent found where defendant silently reached into his pocket,
removed key, then unlocked and opened camper door).
Mr. Marshall did not consent to Trooper Avery's search of the
locked suitcases. The state does not argue that Mr. Marshall's
consent to search the trunk should be construed to include locked
suitcases found in the trunk.8 Rather, the state argues that
his disclaimer of ownership of the suitcases should be construed
to validate the search. We agree that Mr. Marshall made a
somewhat ambiguous disclaimer of ownership of the four suitcases
found in the trunk of the vehicle, but he did not give his
consent to their search.9 The state has not referred us to any
case where a disclaimer of ownership has been held to be a
voluntary consent to search. The cases approving the subsequent
search of a suitcase after disclaimer of ownership have all
turned on the threshold issue of standing or abandonment, not

8. See State v. Cole, 31 Wash. App. 501, 643 P.2d 675 (1982),
where the defendant gave permission to search his hatchback
vehicle, but did not give consent to search the suitcases found
in the vehicle. III. at 678. The court held that the consent to
search the vehicle did not encompassed the suitcases. Id.
9. Trooper Avery believed that Mr. Marshall's denial of
ownership of the suitcases validated the search. He did what our
case law has instructed and the defect in the search was not as a
result of his actions, but rather those of the prosecutor in
failing to properly raise the issue of standing.
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consent. 10 We refuse to rely on this authority as it would
allow the state to circumvent the teachings of State v.
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), and allow the state to
raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time
on appeal by way of the back door.
In summary/ we reverse the trial court's denial of the motion
to suppress as Mr. Marshall did not consent-in-fact11 to the
search of the locked suitcases found in the trunk of his vehicle.

Norman H. Jacksoff, Judge

10. See United States v. Williams, 538 F.2d 549, 550-51 (4th
Cir. 1976) (court found abandonment and held cases properly
seized when defendant denied ownership of certain cases found in
his motel room and allowed the search of the cases); United
States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (court found
abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and
began to walk away from them).
11. We do not reach the issue of the voluntariness of Mr.
Marshall's consent to the search of the car, the trunk, or the
suitcases because we find there was no consent-in-fact to the
search of the suitcases. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (analysis of voluntariness of consent); State
v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (state did
not sustain its burden to prove defendant's consent was
voluntary).
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